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SURVIVE ANOTHER DAY: USING CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF
INVESTMENTS TO MEASURE THE COST OF CREDIT CONSTRAINTS
Luis Garicano and Claudia Steinwender*
Abstract—We introduce a novel empirical strategy to measure the size of
credit shocks. Theoretically, we show that credit shocks reduce the value
of long-term relative to short-term investments. Empirically, we can there-
fore compare the reduction of long-term relative to short-term investments
within firms, allowing for firm-times-year fixed effects. Using Spanish firm-
level data, we estimate the credit crunch to be equivalent to an additional
tax rate of around 11% on the longest-lived capital. To pin down credit
constraints as the underlying cause, we apply triple-differences strategies
using foreign ownership or precrisis debt maturity.
I. Introduction
STUDYING the impact of credit shocks on investmentempirically requires solving an identification problem:
separating the impact of the supply of credit from the impact
of the aggregate demand shock that usually takes place con-
currently. To do this, the more recent literature has proposed
a within-firm estimator that holds the firm constant and
compares the effect of different lenders on the same firm.1
Here, we propose an alternative within-firm estimator, using
variation in different investment duration classes within a
firm.
Our strategy exploits the differential impact of demand
shocks and liquidity constraints on the composition of invest-
ments. As we show formally in a simplified version of
Aghion et al. (2009), absent liquidity constraints, firms
equalize the value of the marginal dollar on short-term and
long-term investments. However, under liquidity constraints,
long-term investments involve a risk, since the firm may have
to liquidate before the payoff period. This creates a wedge
between the value of short- and long-term investments: Firms
are willing to give up some future expected payoffs in order
to increase the probability of surviving another day.
Our theoretical discussion suggests to us a precise empir-
ical strategy. Assuming that demand shocks affect short-
term and long-term investments within firms similarly (an
assumption that we discuss in detail), the difference between
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1 See, for example, Gan (2007), Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini
(2008), Iyer et al. (2014), Jimenez et al. (2010), Iyer and Peydró (2011),
Schnabl (2012), Jimenez et al. (2012), and Paravisini et al. (2015).
the longer-term and the shorter-term investment, if posi-
tive, is equal to a first-order approximation of the impact
of the credit shock. A crucial advantage of our strategy is
that it allows us to examine the shift in the composition of
investment within firms before and after a financial shock,
including firm-times-year fixed effects to make sure that nei-
ther demand shocks nor unobserved heterogeneity between
firms bias the estimated impact of credit constraints.
Our identification strategy requires formulating a taxon-
omy of investments by their time to payoff, or durability.
Surveying an extensive existing literature on the relative
durability of different investment categories, we conclude
that the shortest-lived investment is advertising, followed by
IT, R&D, with fixed capital investment like equipment and
machinery being, on average, the longest lived.
To conduct our empirical analysis, we need two things:
a credit crisis and detailed data about different investment
types. In the case of Spain, both are available. We use the
financial crisis in 2008 as an exogenous shock to credit sup-
ply. This is possible because this crisis was, at its core, a
banking crisis. Previous research has established that the
reduced bank liquidity translated into a reduction of credit
supply to firms.2 This is particularly true for the case of
Spain, where the liquidity crisis was exceptionally severe,
despite the fact that the European Central Bank engaged
as a lender of last resort (Drechsler et al., 2016). Jimenez
et al. (2012) show that weaker banks deny more loans, even
when the loans are identical, and that firms usually can-
not substitute the weak bank with another bank.3 For Spain,
detailed investment data is also available. We use a rich,
high-quality, long-term panel data set of manufacturing firms
that breaks up investment into six categories: advertising, IT,
R&D, vehicles, machinery, and furniture.
Applying our estimation strategy to the Spanish data, we
find that after the financial crisis, the longest-term invest-
ments were reduced by 17 percentage points more than
shortest-term investments. Given our theory, this is equiv-
alent to an 11% incremental tax rate on the longest-term
investment.
The second part of our empirical analysis aims to more
precisely pin down credit constraints as the mechanism lead-
ing to the change in investment patterns (as in Bernanke &
Gertler, 1989). If credit constraints were indeed the cause of
2 For example, Iyer et al. (2014), Paravisini et al. (2015), Ivashina and
Scharfstein (2010), Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012), and Santos (2011) for
the financial crisis in 2008 and Chava and Purnanandam (2011) for the
Russian crisis in 1998.
3 Bentolila et al. (2013) show that firms that borrowed more from weak
financial institutions that were later bailed out (almost all being savings
banks, or Cajas de Ahorros) reduced employment by an additional 3.5 to 5
percentage points relative to firms that borrowed from healthier ones.
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the change, we should see a stronger effect for firms that were
more affected by them. In triple-differences analyses, we use
two ways, suggested by the literature, to identify those firms:
domestic firms (as opposed to foreign ones, which typically
have access to external finance through their parent compa-
nies), and firms with a lot of mature debt that needs to be
rolled over at the beginning of the crisis.
Our triple-differences analysis using nationality of own-
ership may still fail to convince us, since domestic and
foreign-owned firms differ among a variety of other dimen-
sions besides their access to external funding. Therefore, we
show that our results survive a variety of robustness checks.
First, we use only multinational firms for our comparison: all
are large, have subsidiaries in many countries, and are heav-
ily export oriented. Second, we use an inverse propensity
score reweighting scheme based on the size, growth, export
status, and export development of firms before the finan-
cial crisis. Third, Spanish firms are smaller, so we control
for firm size. Fourth, the exit rates of Spanish and foreign
firms are not statistically significantly different, so compo-
sitional effects are not driving our results. Finally, the data
show no difference between Spanish and foreign firms in the
maturities of liabilities after the crisis.
In the second triple-differences analysis, we use the ratio
of short-term debt over total debt to identify firms with a lot
of mature debt that needs to be rolled over at the beginning
of the crisis. This measure is arguably superior to owner-
ship, because it is less likely to be correlated with other firm
characteristics that might also affect investment behavior.
Since the credit squeeze in Spain went hand-in-hand with
a recession, we carefully empirically evaluate three theoreti-
cal channels through which a demand shock could confound
our estimates. The first hypothesis we label the interest rate
channel and the substitution effect. It argues that due to a
demand-driven reduction in interest rates, firms will sub-
stitute (contrary to our findings) short-term with long-term
investments. If this is true, our estimates are a lower bound
of the true effect. Another hypothesis, labeled differential
impact of uncertainty, argues that a recession driven increase
in uncertainty might lead firms to reduce long-term invest-
ments by more than short-term investments. However, our
triple differences specifications allow us to include category-
year fixed effects to control for recession driven changes in
the composition of investment. Another hypothesis, which
we label differential depreciation, argues that, due to the dif-
ferent depreciation rates across investment types, the same
desired fall in capital stock due to a demand shock would
translate into different percentage changes in long-term and
short-term investments. However, a different normalization
of investment, by capital stock, shows that this explana-
tion is also not driving our results. In any case, a negative
demand shock should be reflected in the output of firms,
which we test for. Furthermore, sales as a direct firm-level
measure of the demand shock are not showing the same
effects on investment pattern as our measures for credit
constraints.
Our finding that credit constraints induce firms to sacrifice
long-term future profits in order to guarantee survival for
another day complements a large body of literature showing
that financially constrained firms invest less.4 This is also the
case for recent studies that use the worldwide financial crisis
in 2007–2008 as an exogenous shock to the credit supplied
by banks.5 A smaller set of literature has studied how credit
rationing affects the composition of firm investments but do
not offer an explanation why certain investment types might
be more affected than others.6
Beyond these substantive findings, our paper points a way
forward methodologically to learn about credit shocks. The
rotation in the investment vector toward the present and away
from the future informs us about the existence and the size
of the credit crunch.
II. Theoretical Framework and Identification
Most theoretical analysis of liquidity constraints aggre-
gates all investment into a single decision (Kiyotaki &
Moore, 1997). Instead, we assume that a profit-maximizing
firm can choose between two types of investment: short-term
investments kt yield an immediate payoff f (kt), while long-
term investments zt yield a higher payoff (1+ρ)f (zt), which
is paid out at a later period. To capture this trade-off, we
rely on a model that is a simplified version of Aghion et al.
(2009). The key difficulty of firms is that with probability
1 − λt+1, a liquidity crisis in the interim period before the
payoff of the long-term investment is realized, which may
force the firm to liquidate. Thus, the probability of survival
λt+1 measures the probability that the entrepreneur will have
enough funds to cover the liquidity shock and is allowed to
depend on the levels of short- and long-term investments.
Specifically, reallocating investments from long to short term
increases the probability of survival,
(
∂λt+1
∂kt −
∂λt+1
∂zt
)
> 0.
The choice of how much short-run and long-run investment
to undertake is then given by
max
kt , zt
Et
[f (kt) + βλt+1(1 + ρ)f (zt) − qtkt − qtzt] ,
where λt+1 measures the probability that the entrepreneur
will have enough funds to cover the liquidity shock, ρ is the
additional productivity of long-term investment, and the rest
of terms have their usual meanings.
Combining the two first-order conditions with respect to
k and z, we obtain the marginal condition,
Et
[f ′(kt)] = βEt [(1 − τt+1) (1 + ρ)f ′(zt)] , (1)
4 Whited (1992), Carpenter et al. (1994), Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited
(1995), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996, 1999), Kaplan and Zingales
(1997), Lamot (1997), Cleary (1999), Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002),
Amiti and Weinstein (2013), Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988).
5 Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010), Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy
(2010), Almeida et al. (2012), Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016).
6 See Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) for the allocation of investment between
new and used capital, as well as Campello et al. (2010), who point out
that firms cut technology and marketing investment by more than capital
investment.
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where
τt+1 = (1 − λt+1) +
(
∂λt+1
∂kt
− ∂λt+1
∂zt
) f (zt)
f ′(zt) .
This contrasts with the first best, absent liquidity shocks,
when it should be the case that the marginal value of a dollar
is equalized across both types of investments:
Et
[ f ′(kt)] = βEt [(1 + ρ)f ′(zt)] . (2)
Thus, the risk that the firm will run out of cash in period
t +1 works exactly like a tax on investment τt+1 and reduces
the value of the (a priori more profitable) long-term invest-
ments relative to the first best. The first term of this wedge,
(1 − λt+1), captures the probability of failure. The second
term captures the marginal change in this probability as we
reallocate investment from long term to short term. Given
that reallocating investments from long term to short term
increases the probability of survival, the tax wedge τt+1 > 0.
Hence, the propensity for reallocation away from long-term
investment opportunities to short-term ones is higher—the
higher the probability of avoiding bankruptcy by doing this,
the higher the probability of not having enough liquidity next
period, and the lower the marginal productivity of long-run
investments.
The model predicts that credit-constrained firms will
reduce long-term investment by more than short-term invest-
ment in order to secure survival. Our theoretical framework
suggests a new empirical strategy, closely linked to the
theory, that can help us to identify credit shocks.
Suppose that there are good ex ante reasons to expect
liquidity to be plentiful before the shock to credit supply
(denoted by subscript b) and to expect liquidity to be scarce
after the credit shock (denoted by subscript a). Then we have
from equation (2) that for a given firm i,
f ′(kib) = β(1 + ρ)f ′(zib)εib,
assuming εi ∼ ln N(1, σ2) and i.i.d. Using a Cobb-Douglas
function y = kα to get exact expressions (everything goes
through as a log-linear approximation otherwise), taking
logs, and substracting the expression from the equivalent
one from equation (1) suggests the following difference-
in-differences estimator as the way to identify the wedge
introduced by the liquidity shock in firm i,
(1 − α) ((ln zia − ln zib)− (ln kia − ln kib))
= ln (1 − τit+1)+ ln εia − ln εib,
where E
(
ln εia − ln εib
) = 0.
Consider the following difference-in-differences specifi-
cation using investment I in investment category c = {k, z}
as a dependent variable,
ln Iict = β0 + β1 × crisist × longtermc + crisist
+ longtermc + νict , (3)
where crisist is a dummy variable that turns 1 in the years of a
financial crisis and longtermc is a dummy variable indicating
a long-term investment. In this specification, the coefficient
on the interaction term equals
β1 = E ((ln Iiza − ln Iizb) − (ln Iika − ln Iikb)) .
This last expression equals, up to a factor, the wedge
between long-term and short-term investments, which has
a clear economic interpretation in the theory:
β1 = E (ln (1 − τt+1))
(1 − α) . (4)
In reality, and in our data, we have more than two
investment categories; thus, we generalize (3) to multiple
investment types. Furthermore, we can include firm times
year fixed effects as well as investment category fixed effects
to make sure that same structural equation above is identified.
This leads to our estimated regression equation:
ln Iict = β0 + β1 ∗ crisist ∗ duration-of-invc
+ firm ∗ year FEit + cat FEc + νict . (5)
III. Data
For the theory to guide our empirical work, we rely on
an extensive literature—for example, by accountants and
growth accountants—to provide a taxonomy of tangible and
intangible investments by the horizon over which they pay
off, or their durability.7
The shortest-lived investment category is that of brand
equity and advertising. Landes and Rosenfield (1994) esti-
mate the annual rates of decay of advertising to be more than
50% for most industries, using twenty two-digit SIC manu-
facturing and service industries. For a number of industries,
they even find that the effect of advertising does not per-
sist until the following year. A more recent literature review
by Corrado, Hutten, and Sichel (2009) concludes that the
depreciation rate for advertising is 60%, the value we use.
They also note that 40% of advertising expenditure is spent
on advertisements that last less than a year (e.g., on “this
week’s sale”), which partly explains the short-lived impact
of advertising.
The literature reports a depreciation rate of around 30%
for software investments. The Bureau of Economic Analysis
(1994) estimated a depreciation rate of 33% for a five-year
service life, according to Corrado et al. (2009). Tamai and
Torimitsu (1992) report a nine-year average life span for
software (between two and twenty years), relying on survey
evidence. The Spanish accounting rules give a depreciation
rate of 26% for IT equipment and software, so we use a
value of around 30% as summarizing the evidence in our
main specification.
7 The text is summarized in table form in the online appendix.
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Table 1.—Summary Statistics
Mean (Standard Error)
Before Crisis After Crisis
(2003–2007) (2008–2010) Change Change in %
Investment categories, mn EUR (ordered by depreciation rate)
Advertising 150.99 118.77 −32.22∗∗ −21.3%∗∗
(9.86) (12.79)
IT 6.20 3.86 −2.34∗∗∗ −37.7%∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.53)
R&D 1.12 1.05 −0.07 −6.3%
(0.13) (0.16)
Vehicles 4.20 6.10 1.90 45.2%
(0.60) (2.33)
Machinery 198.57 141.78 −56.79∗∗∗ −28.6%∗∗∗
(13.86) (13.49)
Furniture and office equipment 37.73 33.98 −3.75 −9.9%
(4.71) (5.35)
Credit
Credit ratio (total credit/total assets) 0.57 0.54 −0.03∗∗∗ −5.3%∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Credit cost (%)a 4.06 4.28 0.22∗∗∗ 5.4%∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
a Total cost of a credit (incl. interest rates, but also other fees) as a percentage of obtained credit.
The evidence on the average depreciation rates and
average life spans of R&D capital is extensive, and esti-
mates range from 10% to 30%. Pakes and Schankerman
(1984, 1986) propose 25% based on five European countries,
and 11% to 26% in a later study for Germany, the United
Kingdom, and France. Nadiri and Prucha (1996) estimated a
rate of 12% for R&D, while Bernstein and Mamuneas (2006)
estimate the depreciation rate at 18% to 29%. Corrado et al.
(2009) review the literature and settle on a value of 20% for
R&D, which is the value we use.
Longer-lived investments include fixed tangible assets
like machinery, vehicles, and other equipment. The Span-
ish accounting rules yield similar values for these types
of investment, with vehicles having a depreciation rate of
around 16%, machinery around 12%, and furniture and office
equipment around 10%.8
We rely on the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales
(ESEE), a panel of Spanish manufacturing firms, for data on
investment. This data set has been collected by the Spanish
government and the SEPI foundation every year since 1990,
covering around 1,800 firms per year.9 We used data from
2003 to 2010 in our analysis.
In contrast to balance sheet firm-level databases, the Span-
ish data cover a number of different investment choices made
by firms that can be linked to our investment categories based
on time to payoff: advertising expenditure; IT expenses;
R&D expenses; and investment in vehicles, machinery, and
furniture and office equipment. Besides these main invest-
ment variables, we also have data on the credit ratio of firms
8 See http://www.individual.efl.es/ActumPublic/ActumG/MementoDoc
/MF2012_Coeficientes%20anuales%20de%20amortizacion_Anexos.pdf.
The BEA’s accounting rules are very similar: http://www.bea.gov/scb
/account_articles/national/wlth2594/tableC.htm.
9 See https://www.fundacionsepi.es/investigacion/esee/en/spresentacion
.asp.
and other complementary variables such as sales, exports,
and foreign ownership.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables
that are the object of our analysis, before and after the cri-
sis.10 The data shows that investment in all categories fell
after the financial crisis in 2008.11 However, ex ante, it is
not clear whether this investment drop is triggered by the
credit squeeze or the adverse demand shock. Our empirical
strategy aims to disentangle these effects.
The credit crunch triggered by the financial crisis is also
reflected in the Spanish credit data: total credit as a per-
centage of total assets (the credit ratio) fell by 3 percentage
points after the crisis, from 57% to 54%. At the same time,
observed average credit cost increased by 0.22 percentage
points, from 4.06% to 4.28%. This is obviously a lower
bound on the increased cost, as firms often simply could
not get access to credit. Together with the observed imme-
diate drop in the credit ratio, this suggests that we observe a
credit supply rather than a credit demand shock immediately
after the financial crisis hit.
IV. Results
Table 2 presents our main results from estimating regres-
sion equation (5). Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level, allowing for autocorrelation across time and across
10 Two other investment categories, land and buildings, are available in
our data. These are very long-lived investments and showed the largest
statistically significant drop. However, since the financial crisis in Spain
was based on a real estate bubble, which led to falling real estate prices, it
seemed safer to exclude land and building from our analysis, as it would
have biased our results toward finding our hypothesized effect.
11 The single exception is vehicles, where a “cash for clunkers” plan (Plan
Renove) was introduced by the government. Using a specification similar
to that of Mian and Sufi (2012), we can show that this plan had a similar
impact to the one documented in the United States.
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Table 2.—Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(inv) ln(inv) Inv/stock Inv/stock ln(inv)
(1/depreciation rate) × −0.020∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.346∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗
after 2008 dummy (0.006) (0.016) (0.121) (0.073)
(Year = 2004) × −0.003
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.008)
(Year = 2005) × −0.003
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.009)
(Year = 2006) × 0.005
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.009)
(Year = 2007) × 0.004
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.009)
(Year = 2008) × −0.003
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.010)
(Year = 2009) × −0.026∗∗
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.010)
(Year = 2010) × −0.032∗∗∗
(Time-to-payoff measure) (0.010)
Observations 43,900 88,331 43,900 88,331 43,900
Partial R2 0.582 0.235 0.004 0.003 0.583
Including 0’s Yes Yes
All regressions include category FE and firm × year FEs. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level, allowing for autocorrelation across time and across investment categories within the firm. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
investment categories within the firm.12 All columns include
firm times year fixed effects. If demand shocks do not
have a differential effect across investment types, we man-
age to control for them in this way. The coefficient on
the interaction term in column 1 is negative, implying that
investments with a longer time to payoff fell more after the
financial crisis than investments with a shorter time to pay-
off. Note that in contrast to other papers on the effect of
credit squeezes on investment, this is likely to be a lower
bound of the true estimate; if demand shocks affect invest-
ment types differentially, they are likely to affect investments
with a shorter time to payoff by more than investments with
a longer time to payoff (the recession will, after all, finish at
some point in the future). It is common that investment obser-
vations are 0 and thus excluded from the analysis (in logs).
Column 2 codes the 0’s as 1 euro and thus includes all those
observations. The results are substantially stronger, suggest-
ing our baseline analysis is very conservative. Columns 3 and
4 normalize investment by the capital stock at the beginning
of period.13 Column 3 excludes investments of 0, whereas
column 4 includes it. The different ways of normalizing
investment do not affect the results; a highly significant
negative effect is visible across all specifications.
In the online appendix, we conduct a variety of robustness
checks. For example, we use the rank of investment types
12 Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) point out that serially cor-
related outcomes in differences-in-differences estimations produce serially
correlated residuals, and standard errors need to be adjusted accordingly.
They recommend clustering errors at the group level if the number of groups
is large enough (e.g., 50). For our regression, this would mean clustering at
the investment category level; unfortunately, our number of categories is too
small for clustering (six categories). We decided to correct for autocorrela-
tion of the residuals by clustering at the firm level instead, which allows for
arbitrary serial correlation over time, as well as across investment categories
within a firm.
13 See the online appendix for details.
as an alternative measure for time to payoff, we regroup
investment categories, we use the depreciation rate directly
as regressor, and we omit one investment category at a time.
Our results are robust to all of these specifications.
How can we interpret the economic significance of our
effect? In our preferred specification in column 1 in table 2,
investment falls by 2 percentage points for a unit increase in
the inverse depreciation rate. This leads to our main result:
investment in office equipment (the category with the lowest
depreciation rate) gets reduced by 17 percentage points more
than advertising (the category with the highest depreciation
rate), a sizable difference.14
Our theory suggests interpreting this result as a tax on
capital. Given that the investment gap between capital with
the shortest and longest time to payoff (β1 in the theory)
is 17% and using α = 1/3 (the capital share) in equation
(4), our results mean that the credit crunch is equivalent
to an 11% tax on the long-run investments relative to the
shortest-run one.15
So far we have pooled the estimated effect across all
years before and after the crisis, respectively. In order to
make sure we are capturing the effect of the credit squeeze
instead of something else, we check whether the timing of the
effect really coincides with the credit squeeze and conduct a
placebo test by allowing the interaction term to vary by year.
The results in column 5 of table 2 support our story: the coef-
ficient becomes negative (but still insignificant) in the year
2008 and becomes even more negative and highly significant
thereafter. This timing is consistent with the development of
the credit squeeze. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008, conditions tightened severely. The first full
14 See the online appendix for details.
15 τt+1= 1− exp (−0.17 × 2/3)= 10.6%.
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Table 3.—Mechanism: Credit Squeeze
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy if after crisis −0.015∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ 0.006
(year = 2008 and after) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Interaction term (Spanish firm −0.025∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗
dummy) × (after 2008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(industry exports to EU) 0.021 0.024 0.058
(0.037) (0.037) (0.040)
ln(industry exports to World) −0.009 −0.013 −0.056
(0.037) (0.037) (0.041)
ln(industry output) 0.013 0.014 0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Observations 13,915 13,915 13,897 13,897 13,897
Partial R2 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.003
Number of firms FE 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes
Industry × Year FEs Yes
The dependent variable is the credit ratio (total credit divided by total assets, ratio between 0 and 1). The Spanish firm dummy is defined by 50% or lower foreign ownership in the same year. All standard errors are
two-way clustered at the firm and industry × year level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
year in which the effects of the credit crunch were fully
spread was 2009.16
Now we aim to further pin down credit constraints as
cause for the observed change in the investment behavior as
opposed to other mechanisms, which could lead to similar
effects, such as an increase in uncertainty (Bloom, 2009;
Bernanke, 1983), which could increase the option value of
waiting. If our hypothesis is true, we should expect to see
a differential effect on firms that are more affected by the
credit crunch.
The literature suggests two types of affected firms: (1),
domestic firms, since foreign firms have access to external
finance in less affected countries via their parent companies
(Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2004; Desai, Foley, & Forbes, 2008;
Kalemli-Ozcan, Kamil, & Villegas-Sanchez, 2010), and (2),
firms that happen to have a lot of mature debt at the beginning
of a financial crisis, because they experience difficulty in
rolling their debt over during a credit crunch (Almeida et al.,
2012).
We start our analysis by looking at foreign versus domestic
firms. If it is true that foreign firms are less affected by a
credit squeeze, then we should observe a fall in the credit
ratio only for domestic firms. Table 3 tests this. In column 1,
we find that the credit ratio, defined by total credit divided by
assets, on average fell after the crisis, a result that was already
visible from the summary statistics in table 1. Column 2
controls for industry-specific demand conditions using the
industry’s exports and size as a time-varying control. Also,
firm-level fixed effects allow us to control for any other time-
invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity.
Column 3 compares the drop between Spanish and
foreign-owned firms and answers the following question:
Comparing two firms of the same size that are facing the
same demand conditions, does the firm that happens to be
Spanish suffer a significant drop in credit after the crisis?
16 In the online appendix, we provide robustness checks using alternative
definitions of time to payment and F-tests on the equality of the coefficients
to the one in 2007.
The answer is unambiguous and highly significant: Span-
ish firms suffer a drop in credit of around 2.5 percentage
points after the crisis compared to non-Spanish firms. In
column 4 we add time fixed effects to capture any common
time-varying aspects of the crisis that are not yet captured by
industry exports or size, and the effect remains the same. Col-
umn 5 is our most demanding specification, which allows for
industry-specific time effects (and thus absorbs our previous
industry-specific controls), and the result is again stronger,
with Spanish firms facing a credit drop of 3.5 percentage
points. This is equivalent to a 6.1% drop in credit relative to
the 2007 baseline of 57.8% credit to assets for Spanish firms
before the crisis.
Thus, under our hypothesis, the shift in the composition of
investment (if linked to credit) should occur only in Spanish
firms. In table 4 we start the analysis by running the main
regression separately for domestic and foreign firms. Only
the effect in column 1 is negative and statistically signifi-
cant, suggesting that only domestic firms cut their long-term
investment relatively more than their short-term investment.
There is no significant difference across investment types
for foreign-owned firms. In columns 3 and 4, we conduct
placebo tests by allowing the interaction term to vary by
year. Again, we see that the effect is driven by domestic
firms, in line with our hypothesis.17
We can test this more formally by extending our analysis
to a triple-difference estimation, comparing long-term versus
short-term investments before and after the financial crisis
in 2008 for Spanish versus foreign firms. This allows us to
further challenge our results by including category × year
fixed effects in addition to the firm × year fixed effects to
control for the possibility that firms might reduce or increase
investment in certain categories during recessions.
Table 5 shows the results of the triple difference speci-
fication. Column 1 repeats the main specification, column
2 shows the results of the triple difference estimation with
17 In the online appendix, we provide F-tests for the equality of postcrisis
coefficients to the 2007 coefficient.
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Table 4.—Foreign versus Domestic Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic Only Foreign Only Domestic Only Foreign Only
Long-term investment × −0.029∗∗∗ 0.018
after 2008 dummy (0.006) (0.014)
(Year = 2004) × −0.004 −0.002
Long-term investment (0.009) (0.015)
(Year = 2005) × −0.009 0.009
Long-term investment (0.010) (0.018)
(Year = 2006) × 0.002 0.005
Long-term investment (0.010) (0.020)
(Year = 2007) × 0.003 −0.003
Long-term investment (0.010) (0.021)
(Year = 2008) × −0.016 0.045∗∗
Long-term investment (0.011) (0.022)
(Year = 2009) × −0.035∗∗∗ 0.006
Long-term investment (0.011) (0.023)
(Year = 2010) × −0.043∗∗∗ 0.005
Long-term investment (0.011) (0.024)
Observations 35,346 8,479 35,346 8,479
R2 0.566 0.661 0.566 0.661
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 5.—Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Time-to-payoff measure) × −0.020∗ 0.020
(After 2008 dummy) (0.012) (0.019)
(Time-to-payoff measure) × (After 2008 dummy) −0.049∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗
× (Domestic firm dummy) (0.019) (0.020) (0.058)
(Time-to-payoff measure) × 0.033∗∗ 0.034∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗
(Domestic firm dummy) (0.017) (0.017) (0.048)
Observations 41,550 41,475 41,475 88,223
Partial R2 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005
Firm × year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Category FEs Yes Yes
Category × year FEs Yes Yes
Including 0’s Yes
All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and industry × year level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
category fixed effects, and column 3 replaces them by the
full category × year fixed effects.18 The triple difference
estimation shows a significant differential negative effect
for long-term investments after the crisis undertaken by
Spanish firms. Column 4 codes the 0’s as 1 euro and thus
includes all the 0 investments. Again, the results are sub-
stantially stronger, suggesting our baseline analysis is very
conservative.
The differential effects for domestic firms by investment
category and over time are visualized in figure 1. Darker
lines depict investment types with a longer time to payoff,
for which we would expect a larger drop. The visual evidence
is broadly in line with our hypothesis, as lighter lines show a
smaller drop and darker lines show a larger drop after 2008.
It is also notable that until 2007, there is no differential effect
by investment types; the lines are all parallel and very close.
The differential effect starts to come in only after 2007, when
the credit crunch hits.
A worry is that domestic and foreign-owned firms differ
among a variety of dimensions besides access to external
18 Note that the domestic firm dummy variable in the data is not time
invariant, as it changes with ownership changes. However, there are very
few of those in the data, and they are not driving our results.
Figure 1.—Investment Change by Investment Type,
Triple Difference Estimation
Darker lines depict investment types with a longer time-to-payoff, for which we would expect a larger
drop.
funding. For example, Spanish-owned firms in our data are
typically smaller and less likely to export and might therefore
show a different investment behavior. To address this con-
cern, table 6 conducts a variety of robustness checks. One
dimension of time-varying, unobserved heterogeneity might
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Table 6.—Robustness Checks Foreign versus Domestic Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Time-to-payoff measure) × 0.034∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.063 0.007 0.008
(Domestic firm dummy) (0.017) (0.017) (0.038) (0.015) (0.016)
(Time-to-payoff measure) × −0.052∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.074∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗
(After 2008) × (Domestic firm) (0.020) (0.019) (0.039) (0.018) (0.018)
(Time-to-payoff measure) × −0.013∗∗∗
ln(sales) (0.004)
(Time-to-payoff measure) × 0.002
(After 2008 dummy) × ln(sales) (0.006)
(Time-to-payoff measure) × −0.014∗∗∗
ln(TFP) (0.005)
(Time-to-payoff measure) × 0.001
(After 2008 dummy) × ln(TFP) (0.007)
Observations 41,475 22,909 23,965 41,475 38,791
Partial R2 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.002
Number of Firm × Year FE 11,028 5,731 6,302 11,028 10,300
Columns 1, 4, and 5 use the baseline sample, all companies. Column 2: Only firms that belong to a corporate group. Column 3: Inverse propensity score reweighting. All regressions include firm × year FEs and
category × year FEs. All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and industry × year level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
be differences between companies that operate across coun-
tries and those that operate in a single country. Companies
that operate in many countries belong to a corporate group,
and this could provide them with advantages that go beyond
their access to capital. For example, they might face a more
diversified demand. Column 2 conducts our analysis only
for companies that belong to a corporate group. Presumably
most of them are multinationals. The results are remark-
able. Even though the sample size drops substantially (by
more than half), the effect remains very similar and highly
significant.19
Column 3 uses another way to make the control group of
foreign firms a more suitable counterfactual for the treatment
group of domestic firms by applying inverse propensity score
weights. This type of matching estimator reweights each
observation by its (inverse) propensity score (the likelihood
that a firm belongs to the treatment group, that is, it is under
Spanish ownership) in order to generate the same distribu-
tion of (observed) characteristics of treatment and control
group, and therefore, we hope, also match the unobserved
time-varying heterogeneity better. We construct propensity
scores based on sales and export status (as these observ-
ables seem to be the major differences between Spanish-
and foreign-owned firms) of all pretreatment years based
on a probit regression of the treatment on sales and export
status in all years between 2003 and 2007. The predicted
values of these regressions, ̂treat, are then used to calcu-
late inverse propensity score weights psw = ̂treat1− ̂treat for
each firm. We use these weights for all firms in the con-
trol group in our regression (for more details on the method,
see DiNardo, Fortin, & Lemieux. 1996 and Nichols, 2007,
2008). Our results in column 3 are robust to this test,
suggesting that selection is not a major concern in our
analysis.
19 In the online appendix, we show that the results are consistent when
using different definitions of multinationals, such as firms that have non-
industrial plants in foreign countries or those that have share holdings in
foreign countries.
The last two columns in table 6 analyze whether firm size
or productivity differences are driving the results by includ-
ing interaction terms with ln(sales) and ln(TFP) besides the
interaction term with domestic firms.20 However, both size
and productivity fail to explain the differential drop in invest-
ment. The ownership interaction remains significant, and its
magnitude is unchanged in spite of including this competing
explanation.
A separate concern is the extent to which differential
exit rates of Spanish and foreign-owned firms could explain
these results. Suppose simply that “worse” firms are exit-
ing. If “worse” firms are those that feature more long-term
investments, then we shall see more short-term investment
and less long-term ones in the surviving data. This seems
unlikely a priori, as we tend to think of better firms as the
ones doing more long-term investment. In any case, the exit
rates among Spanish versus foreign firms are not statisti-
cally significantly different (consistent with our mechanism,
as firms manage to avoid bankruptcy due to their changing
investment behavior).21
A final concern is the mechanism through which this
process takes place. Specifically, while we postulate in the
theory that it takes place through the asset side of the bal-
ance sheet (firms have less access to credit in general and
decide to cut long-term investments), an alternative hypoth-
esis is that it takes place through the liability side (firms
have less access to long-term credit and therefore cut long-
term investment because otherwise they cannot match the
liabilities and investments by debt maturity). To test this,
in table 7 we check whether domestic firms suffered a dif-
ferential drop in long-term credit (as a ratio of total credit)
compared to foreign firms, using the same specification as
in table 3. However, while Spanish firms suffer from access
to credit in general as shown in table 3, there is no differ-
ential effect with respect to long-term credit as opposed to
20 See the online appendix for details on TFP estimation.
21 See the online appendix for details.
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Table 7.—Liabilities by Maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy if after crisis (year is = 2008 0.051∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
and after) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
Interaction term (Spanish firms) × 0.000 0.001 0.000
(after 2008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
ln(industry exports to EU) −0.071 −0.073 −0.042
(0.046) (0.046) (0.044)
ln(industry exports to World) 0.060 0.061 0.037
(0.045) (0.045) (0.047)
ln(industry output) −0.050∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.029
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
Observations 14,410 14,410 14,392 14,392 14,392
Partial R2 0.029 0.032 0.033 0.002 0.001
Number of firm FEs 2,707 2,707 2,707 2,707 2,707
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes
Industry × Year FEs Yes
The dependent variable is long-term credit divided by total credit (ratio between 0 and 1). The specifications are the same as in table 3. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 8.—Short-Term Credit before Crisis
(1) (2) (3)
(Time-to-payoff measure) × −0.052∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(after 2008 dummy) × (treatment) (0.020) (0.011) (0.027)
(Time-to-payoff measure) × 0.034∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.019
(treatment) (0.017) (0.011) (0.029)
Observations 41,475 36,135 36,135
Partial R2 0.001 0.001 0.000
This specification is equivalent to the triple-difference estimation conducted in column 3 in table 5.
Column 1 uses domestic firms as the treatment variable as in our baseline specification. Column 2 uses a
dummy variable if short-term credit with financial institutions/total credit is larger than average in 2007.
Column 3 uses the ratio of short-term credit with financial institutions/total credit in 2007 as treatment
variable. All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and industry × year level. All regressions
include firm × year FEs and category × year FEs. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
short-term credit, so a differential liability matching does not
explain our results.
An alternative approach to studying the mechanism that
does not rely on using nationality of ownership as the driver
of credit constraints is to use firms whose debt is maturing
just before the crisis as a treatment group. These firms are
likely to be more severely affected by the credit squeeze as
they have to roll over their debt when the crisis starts. We
use short-term credit with financial institutions divided by
total credit in 2007, the year before the crisis, as a measure
for more credit-constrained firms in table 8. This measure is
arguably a better one for credit constraints than ownership,
as it is less likely to be correlated to other firm characteris-
tics. Column 1 repeats our main specification from before,
using domestic firms as treatment. Column 2 uses a dummy
variable if this short-term credit ratio is larger than average,
and column 3 uses the ratio itself as a continuous measure.
Both columns show a very similar effect compared to our
comparisons of domestic to foreign firms, and the magnitude
is also similar: more-credit constrained firms cut long-term
investment relatively more.
A concern for identification might be that the credit
squeeze in Spain went hand in hand with a recession. Are
we picking up the effects of credit constraints as opposed
to a pure demand shock without financial frictions? We out-
line three theoretical arguments that show how a demand
shock could affect long-term investments by more or by less
than short-term investments. We then show that our empiri-
cal evidence is not consistent with a purely recession-driven
explanation.
A. The Interest Rate Channel and the Substitution Effect
Contrary to the evidence we have presented, the first order
of a demand shock is to reduce short-term by more than
long-term investments. A demand shock means that con-
sumers want to consume less now and save for the future
instead. The increased demand for savings reduces interest
rates. Firms will also invest less because demand is lower,
but falling interest rates also reduce the opportunity cost
of investment in general. The presence of the (temporary)
demand shock provides a differential effect depending on
the time to payoff of the investment: it is optimal to invest
more in long-term investment (which increases output later
when the demand shock is over) than short-term investment
(which increases output now when demand is low). Overall,
long-term investment should then fall less than short-term
investment (or even increase), which is the opposite of what
we find if credit-constrained firms are also hit harder by the
recession.22
B. Differential Impact of Uncertainty
In theory, it is possible that demand shocks could decrease
long-term by more than short-term investments. One expla-
nation involves uncertainty; Bernanke (1983) argues that
uncertainty increases during a recession, which decreases
investment. If uncertainty about expected returns on long-
run investments increases by more than uncertainty about
expected returns on short-run investments, we might expect
to see a differential effect in line with our results—a
fall in long-term investments during the recent recession.
Also, some empirical evidence in the literature points out
22 In the online appendix, we show this formally.
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that certain investment types exhibit a cyclical behavior.
For example, R&D has been found to be procyclical (see
Barlevy, 2007).
We do not believe that a differential impact of the reces-
sion on different investment types is driving the results,
because our triple-differences specifications allow us to
include category-year fixed effects (which is impossible in
the simple difference-in-differences analysis as it is collinear
with the interaction term) to control for recession-driven
changes in the composition of long- and short-term invest-
ments, and our results are robust to this inclusion. For
example, the estimates in columns 2 and 3 of the triple-
differences regressions using firm ownership to indicate
credit constraints in table 5 are almost identical, and also
the robustness checks in table 6 include category-year fixed
effects. We would miss this channel only if the differen-
tial increase in uncertainty across investment types was
different for treated and untreated firms. While this might
theoretically be possible for domestic versus foreign firms
(e.g., because they are different in size and are exposed
differently to foreign markets), the robustness checks indi-
cate that this is unlikely to drive our results. For example,
our propensity score reweighting regression in column 3
in table 6 compares only firms of the same size and with
the same exporting behavior. Also, columns 4 and 5 con-
trol directly for size or productivity differences, and the
results are stable. Furthermore, the triple-differences regres-
sions in table 8 use short-term credit just before the financial
crisis as an indicator for credit constraints. It is hard to
imagine how this measure could be correlated with differen-
tial recession-driven exposure to uncertainty about expected
returns on different investment types, so we are assured that
this hypothesis can be ruled out.
C. Differential Depreciation
An alternative argument for why demand shocks could
reduce long-term investments by more than short-term
investments involves the following reasoning.23 In a reces-
sion, the negative aggregate demand shock will lead capital
stocks to change by the same percentage, but because of the
different depreciation rates, this translates into a different
percentage change in long-term and short-term investments.
However, if we normalize the change in investment by capi-
tal stock (instead of investment, which yielded a percentage
change), we should not expect to see a differential effect.
If (even firm-specific) demand (or productivity) shocks are
driving the results, they are netted out across investment
types. In columns 3 and 4 of table 2, we normalize invest-
ment by capital stock. We find that a significant negative
effect remains. This suggests that aggregate or firm-specific
demand or productivity shocks do not fully drive our results.
23 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for providing this argument.
The formal model is provided in the online appendix.
In general, we would not expect to see a differential effect
of the crisis on long-term investments only for more credit-
constrained firms, unless our measures for credit constraints
(i.e. foreign ownership and share of short-term debt just
before the crisis) are correlated with a larger exposure to the
demand shocks. Such correlation may exist for our measure
of foreign ownership (which might be correlated with export
behavior and therefore differential exposure to other mar-
kets), but our matching estimates control for exporting and
size and therefore compare companies with similar exposure
to demand shocks. Our measure of short-term credit is driven
by debt maturity, which seems unlikely to be correlated with
different exposure to demand shocks.
In any case, a negative demand shock should be reflected
in the output of the firms. So in table 9, we compare the out-
put of credit-constrained firms to the output of unconstrained
firms.24 The results are in line with our claim. Column 1
shows that more credit-constrained firms (panel A mea-
sures credit constraints by ownership, panel B by the share
of short-term credit) reduce total investment by more than
unconstrained firms. Column 2 reflects our earlier results and
shows that credit-constrained firms reduce long-term invest-
ments by even more (using the share of the two investment
types with the highest durability: machinery and furniture)
in total investment as a measure of long-term investment—a
cruder measure of the one we used before. However, there is
no differential impact on sales: column 3 uses the log of total
sales as the dependent variable, which has a small negative
but statistically insignificant coefficient.25 Debt maturity is
arguably more uncorrelated with firms’ exposure to demand
shock, and the coefficient is smaller and has smaller standard
errors.
Besides sales, there is also no differential effect on exports
in column 4 or the propensity to export in column 5 of table
9. There is also no sign of a differential creditworthiness
or quality of the firms, as both pay the same credit cost, as
shown in column 6.26 There is also no significant difference
in the underlying productivity of firms, as measured by TFP
in column 7.
Alternatively, we can use firm-level sales directly as a
measure for each firm’s demand shock to see whether it
drives the investment patterns in the data. This is done in
column 4 of table 6, where we add an interaction term
of the time-to-payoff measure with firm sales. The coef-
ficient on this interaction is negative, which actually goes
against the alternative explanation presented above. A neg-
ative demand shock would reduce short-term investment by
24 Total investment is the sum of investment over the six investment types:
advertising, IT, R&D, vehicles, machinery, and furniture/office equipment.
25 While this means that we cannot reject that firms with more short-term
credit face the same demand shocks, we also cannot reject that they face
a slightly larger negative demand shock. In the online appendix, we show
that even if we take the coefficient seriously, its magnitude is too small to
explain the effect of the recession.
26 Note that the magnitudes of the coefficients are very small; for example,
the coefficient of 0.096 would mean that Spanish firms after the crisis pay
0.09% higher credit cost, but it is insignificant.
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Table 9.—Robustness Checks: Demand Shock
(2) (5) (6)
(1) Long-Term (3) (4) Export Credit (7)
ln(inv) Inv/Inv ln(sales) ln(exports) Dummy Cost, % ln(TFP)
A. Spanish firms
(Spanish firms) × −0.147∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.032 −0.027 0.001 0.096 −0.031
(after 2008) (0.068) (0.013) (0.029) (0.059) (0.011) (0.188) (0.026)
Observations 12,990 12,990 14,414 9,064 14,414 3,584 13,001
Partial R2 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.000
Number of firm FEs 2,549 2,549 2,710 1,763 2,710 1,002 2,340
B. Short-term credit before crisis
(Short-term credit −0.108∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.011 0.022 −0.014 0.037 −0.018
dummy) × (after 2008) (0.056) (0.013) (0.018) (0.050) (0.010) (0.098) (0.016)
Observations 11,429 11,429 12,608 7,964 12,851 3,131 12,050
Partial R2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of firm FEs 1,925 1,925 2,005 1,331 2,005 805 1,995
A and B show the results of two separate regressions. All columns include firm FEs and industry × year FEs. All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and industry × year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
more than long-term investments, which is more in line with
another explanation of how demand shocks can differentially
affect investment, which we will present below.27 What is
more, including the interaction term with firm sales does not
affect the triple-interaction term with domestic firms (i.e.,
our regressor measuring credit-constrained firms), suggest-
ing that it is credit constraints rather than demand shocks that
drive our results. In column 7 we include interactions with
firm-level productivity, but credit constraints as an explana-
tion for the differential investment pattern remain the robust
effect.
Thus, overall, we read the evidence as supporting our
interpretation that our empirical specifications are indeed
measuring the effect of credit constraints, as opposed to
demand shocks.
V. Conclusion
We have shown how to measure the extent of a credit
crunch by analyzing changes in the composition of invest-
ment within firms. Intuitively, the extent to which firms are
altering the composition of investment away from longer
time to payoff toward more immediate payoff is a measure
of the risk that the firms perceive of facing liquidation due
to lack of access to cash over the relevant period. In this
sense, our measure of the credit crunch yields a clearly iden-
tified economic parameter, which is readily interpretable.
The credit shock is equivalent to an 11% additional tax on
the investment with the longest payoff horizon.
Our findings are particularly important in the specific con-
text of the eurozone credit crisis. This crisis has shown that
a credit crunch, previously always thought to affect mainly
developing countries, can dramatically affect a developed
country—and this in spite of lender-of-last-resort interven-
tions of the central bank, the ECB. Spanish firms affected
27 Also note that the coefficient on the triple-interaction term with firm
sales, time to payoff, and the crisis dummy is very small and insignificant,
indicating that a demand shock during the crisis does not affect a firm’s
investment pattern differently than a demand shock in other years, which it
should not.
by the credit squeeze cut investments with a medium- to
long-term payoff, such as R&D, innovation, and capital
investment, by more than investment with a short-term pay-
off, such as advertising. Credit constraints force Spanish
firms to eat up their future and act as if only the immediate
future, tomorrow, mattered. This is likely to have a long-term
impact on the Spanish economy, impeding recovery after the
financial crisis and reducing long-term economic growth.
Methodologically, our analysis yields estimates of the
impact of the crunch that can serve as input for other mod-
els. The analysis can be easily extended to other locations,
crises, and other capital choices, for example, by comparing
changes in the ratio of used versus new capital equipment,
which are induced by the financial crisis to measure the cost
of the crunch.
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